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Abstract. We study whether robots can satisfy the conditions for agents ﬁt to be
held responsible in a normative sense, with a focus on autonomy and self-control.
An analogy between robots and human groups enables us to modify arguments con-
cerning collective responsibility for studying questions of robot responsibility. On
the basis of Alfred R. Mele’s history-sensitive account of autonomy and responsi-
bility it can be argued that even if robots were to have all the capacities usually re-
quired of moral agency, their history as products of engineering would undermine
their autonomy and thus responsibility.
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1. Introduction
The question in the conference title “What social robots can and should do?” invites one
to discuss both responsible robotics and the responsibility of robots. The ﬁrst concerns
responsible ways to deal with robots, e.g. what should we make and let robots do? Ob-
viously robots should not make humans futile and unemployed, but if that happens, the
responsibility is not to be ascribed to robots but to humans instead. It seems plausible
that robots should not do everything they can, e.g., they should not kill people. Respon-
sible robotics is an issue of collective responsibility of humans. We think that indeed
the closer the social robots are to full-blown agency, e.g. the more human-like they are,
the issue of responsible robotics becomes ever more important; we should ponder thor-
oughly whether we want to create artifacts that possibly are monsters like us. Respon-
sible robotics is obviously related to the other leg of our distinction, e.g., if robots are
moral agents, responsible robotics is likely to look very different from what it would be
if robots were only tool-like instruments.
The other leg of the distinction is responsibility of robots, and this is where we will
focus in this paper. Here a natural point of departure is to think of the conditions of moral
or legal responsibility and see whether robots do or can satisfy such conditions. Relevant
questions include the following: Are robots agents, and if they are, of what kind? How
should we compare human and robot agency? Do robots have self-control? What do we
mean by autonomous robots?
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2. Autonomy in Humans and Artiﬁcial Agents
Agency is typically attributed to robots in artiﬁcial intelligence and in robotics, and there
are also several philosophical accounts of agency according to which robots qualify as
agents, but the question of autonomy is more difﬁcult. Researchers in AI and robotics
standardly talk about autonomous agents in the context of both software agents and phys-
ical robots, but it is important to note that they use the term “autonomous” differently
from the philosophical usage [1]. In their usage, which is largely adopted in media and
everyday parlance, e.g. in such terms as “autonomous vehicles”, autonomy means abil-
ity to perceive the environment, learn from experience, and act independently of an ex-
ternal operator or controller. According to such an understanding, what makes an agent
autonomous is its capability of perceiving and acting in its environment and learning
from its experiences in order to modify its behaviour to promote its survival and improve
its performance in achieving its tasks [2,3]. Such a conception of autonomy is not rel-
evant for attributions of moral responsibility which in philosophical literature typically
requires in addition something like capacity to choose one’s goals and act freely (see,
e.g., [1]).
In the meta-ethical literature something (see, e.g. [4, p. 3]) along the following lines
is meant by “autonomy”: etymologically from “auto” (self) and “nomos” (rule or law)
“self-rule” or “self-government”, and more substantially this involves some kind of at-
titudes and control over principles, values, desires, and the like one possesses. For in-
stance, Gerald Dworkin [5, p. 108] claims that “autonomy is a second-order capacity to
reﬂect critically upon one’s ﬁrst-order preferences and desires, and the ability either to
identify with these or to change them in light of higher-order preferences and values”.
Here it is useful to follow Joel Feinberg and distinguish among the four meanings of
“autonomy” as applied to individual persons: “It can refer either to the capacity to gov-
ern oneself. . . or to the actual condition of self-government . . . or to an ideal of character
derived from that conception; or . . . to the sovereign authority to govern oneself” [6, p.
28].
Autonomy seems closely related to another concept, self-control, which can be un-
derstood, in an Aristotelean fashion, as the contrary of akrasia, which positively and
more substantially can be characterised as a trait of character exhibited in behaviour that
conforms with one’s best or better judgement in the face of the temptation to act to the
contrary [4].
Both autonomy and self-control are commonly taken to be relevant notions in the
characterisation of moral agency that is arguably presupposed by the agentive sense of
responsibility.
It is interesting to evaluate robots in light of such conditions independently of the
question whether human beings can satisfy such conditions. Indeed we try to avoid any
strong pre-commitments as to the issue of the capability of robots to bear normative re-
sponsibility: At the start we keep it as a possibility that robots are responsible in the nor-
mative sense and yet humans are not. Indeed, in the literature there has been discussion of
the possibility of robots outperforming us in moral behaviour for instance in warfare due
to their reasoning capabilities and lack of emotional distraction (for critical discussion,
see [7]).
However, the standard view is that adult human beings are moral agents responsible
of their actions, whereas non-human agents, like animals, robots, and collectives com-
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posed of human individuals, are not. We think it is informative to compare the agency
of robots on the one hand to animal agency and group agency and to human child’s
agency and full-blown human agency on the other. This is because such comparisons
provide us with different arguments, pro and con, concerning the capacity of different
kinds of agents to bear normative responsibility. Although questions concerning attribu-
tion of agency or responsibility to robots have often been studied in relation to similar
attributions to non-human animals [8], in certain respects it is more fruitful to study them
in relation to questions concerning group agency and collective responsibility. This is
because animals differ from adult human beings (paradigmatically assumed to be ﬁt to
be held responsible) in precisely those respects that are taken to warrant attributions of
moral agency, namely features related to rationality, whereas groups are similar in those
respects. On the other hand, adult human beings and animals share several common fea-
tures related to sentience, and hence studying robots in analogy with animals easily leads
to considerations of patiency, which (while interesting in its own right) does not get us
far in understanding responsibility, which we take to be an agentive notion.
Moreover, robots and collective agents are similar in the sense that they are in cer-
tain respects cognitively more powerful than individual human beings. Both robots and
groups of individuals can outperform individual human beings in some cognitive tasks
due to their larger computational or memory resources. Finally, assuming that it is pos-
sible to consider robots and groups as agents, they are both artiﬁcial agents in the sense
that they are both constructed by human beings.
This last common feature in particular suggests that the analogy between robots and
groups might enable us to modify existing arguments concerning group responsibility
to the case of robots. In the case of groups, it can be argued that even if they could in
principle be ﬁt to be held morally responsible, their agency depends in a constitutive way
on the agency of their makers, hence it would be unfair to hold them responsible in a
normative sense [9].
At the core of such line of argumentation is the worry concerning the autonomy
of collective agents. Here psychological autonomy is taken to amount roughly to the
autonomy regarding various aspects of one’s mental or psychological life including one’s
pro-attitudes. One reason why groups can be considered as agents is that their attitudes
are psychologically discontinuous with their members’ attitudes, that is, their actions are
not a function of the attitudes of the individual members [10]. The worry stems from the
fact that collective agents are agents created or designed by the individual members to
serve their purpose(s), and agents that depend on the individual members in executing
their agency. As the autonomy is a necessary condition of an agents’ ﬁtness to be held
responsible, the capacity of collective agents to bear responsibility is also undermined
by the same token as their autonomy is.
The crux of the reasoning here is that the psychological discontinuity is part of
the rational design of the collective agent made by the individual members. To put the
point bluntly, collective agents considered as separate agents are under the control of
the individual members in having the attitudes that are not a function of the attitudes of
the individuals because that is exactly what the individual members do and should want
the collective agents to have. This sort of control seems to question the autonomy of
collective agents, and thus the capacity of such agents to bear responsibility in their own
right, despite the psychological discontinuity between the individual members and the
collective agent.
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The individual members are in control of the core of the value-set, preferences,
and the capacity of critical reﬂection attributable to the collective agent in the following
sense. The collective agent is identiﬁed or “identiﬁes itself” with the purpose which is the
purpose of the individual members, qua individuals, and which provides the individuals
with a reason to create a collective agent. That purpose becomes the core of the value-set
attributable to the collective agent. The decision-making procedure which is constitu-
tive to the collective agent qua autonomous agent can also be described as the constitu-
tive element of the capacity of critical reﬂection attributable to the collective agent. The
shared purpose of the individual members is not only the reason for the existence of the
collective agent, but the purpose also provides the collective agent with a perspective or
orientation from which its faculty of critical reﬂection operates.
Collective agents can also be argued to lack the kind of control over their actions
that is required by moral responsibility. Assume that the individual human members of a
collective agent retain their intentional agency and control over their own actions as they
become members of a collective agent. Assume also that a collective agent can act only
via the intentional actions of its individual human members. The intentional actions of
a collective agent are constituted by the intentional part actions qua part actions of the
individual members of the collective agent. The individual members, qua agents distinct
from the collective agent, are in reason-sensitive control over their part actions qua part
actions; they are in control over the actions they knowingly perform as actions required
by the collective agent’s action.
In light of these assumptions, it seems that even in the case of a continent action by
a collective agent the ultimate responsibility lies at the level of individual members.
On the basis of the reasoning summarily characterised above one can construct an
argument building on widely shared assumptions concerning the ontological and “psy-
chological” nature of collective agents to the effect that collective agents are dependent
and subordinate agents in a way that makes it unfair to hold them morally responsible in
their own right. (See [9] for the full argument.)
The argument does not fully carry over to the case of robots, however. Even though
the agency of robots depends in a constitutive way on the agency of their makers in the
sense that their capacities to have intentional states and to act result from the design and
implementation of these features by human engineers, at some point they gain autonomy
in the engineering sense and become capable of acting without continuous human con-
trol. This is not the case with human groups, which always remain under the control of
their members. However, this is not necessarily a dead-end. There may be grounds to
argue that the fact that the robots’ capacities are engineered sufﬁces to undermine their
responsibility. Let us ﬁrst look at which kinds of capacities have often been required of
moral agency and moral responsibility.
3. Properties Required for Moral Agency and Responsibility
It is a rather common and ﬁrm intuition that robots are not moral agents—they are not
autonomous and morally responsible agents. However, it is only an intuition and intu-
itions do not carry much evidential weight. In what follows we try and offer some aspects
of agency that may offer elements for a diagnosis of the differences between human be-
ings and robots that may account for the intuition. This is not to say that they solve the
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problem whether robots are moral agents, solving the problem would require an account
of necessary and sufﬁcient conditions of moral agency which we are not in the position
to offer. We can, however, ponder whether some of the aspects of the diagnosis are such
that they could be argued to be necessary conditions of a morally responsible agent and
whether it is reasonable to claim that robots can satisfy them.
Another common and ﬁrm intuition is that we, adult human beings, are moral agents.
Our self-image as moral agents consists in part of the understanding of ourselves as both
biologically and psychologically extremely complex creatures with various capacities
falling into the following classes: (1) Intentionality, (2) Rationality and action, (3) Sen-
tience, (4) Autonomy, (5) Normative understanding, and (6) Sociality and personhood
(see Table 1).
Table 1. Capacities and attributes suggested as necessary for moral agency.
Capacities related to































As already mentioned, the list above is not providing us with sufﬁcient nor necessary
conditions of moral agency. However, it is a list of features that we commonly think can
be attributed to a regular human adult. In light of a diagnosis it is of some interest to see
how a robot, the most sophisticated robot imaginable, perhaps one that has evolved as a
result of an artiﬁcial evolutionary process, would fair in terms of these features.
With respect to capacities related to intentionality, there is some controversy, but
probably most roboticists and a large number of philosophers are willing to grant at least
ﬁrst-order intentional states to robots. They would admit that robots can have beliefs,
desires (understood as pro-attitudes) and intentions.
If ﬁrst-order intentionality is granted, then some capacities related to rationality and
action seem to be rather universally accepted, and robots can consequently be taken to
satisfy conditions of agency. Robots are taken to be capable of goal-directed action. It
can be said that robots can make decisions, plan their actions, and that robots are capable
of omission as well.
Higher-order intentionality, capacity for deliberation and setting goals are more de-
batable as are capacities related to sentience, normative understanding and personhood.
It is imaginable that a son of a strong willed soldier becomes a soldier himself, due to
his upbringing he comes to adopt many beliefs, desires and values from his tyrant-like
father. The son starts killing people for his living. He becomes a mercenary. However,
after a couple years of blood shedding, he starts feeling uncomfortable with the job, he
R. Hakli and P. Mäkelä / Robots, Autonomy, and Responsibility 149
starts reﬂecting on the aims of the army, his personal goals, and values. He realises he has
done many bad things in his life. He goes through a serious period of an identity crisis
and ends up giving up pretty much all the values and commitments he has held so far. He
becomes a peace activist. He aims at redemption. He becomes a morally good person.
This very simple story is not implausible when told about a human being, but would it
be even imaginable if the protagonist were a robot? Can a robot set goals, aims, and ends
to itself and change them? (Consider a robot thinking “I used to be a robot working in a
factory but got bored with it and now I am doing maths.”)
There are many other perplexing questions concerning potential capacities of robots.
Can a robot exercise self-reﬂection on its values directing its goal setting, planning and
actions? (“I used to think that war is right but then I realised it only causes suffering
and now I understand causing unnecessary suffering to human beings and other robots is
wrong, I am all for peace and love now?”) Can a robot be aware of its responsibility? Can
a robot recognise normative reasons? (“I want to do some more maths, but there is a kid
buried to the back yard of my neighbour, perhaps I should go and save her?”) Perhaps a
robot can suffer from the weakness of will? Is a robot capable of having various kinds
of motivational urges that may cause trouble for rational action? If a robot is capable of
rational action, then maybe also incontinent action (even though designing robots riddled
with weakness of will and incontinent action may not be in anyone’s interest)?
We tend to think of robots as designed, developed, and engineered by someone else,
mechanical, target bound, having narrow and speciﬁc intentional horizon, lacking feel-
ings and emotions, etc. However, they are also capable of learning, have enormous com-
putational power, they can perform extremely complex tasks, they are perhaps more re-
liable than human beings (e.g., self driving cars). What are the relevant aspects for the
evaluation of their moral citizenship or lack thereof? Maybe the moral agency is an issue
of degree? Would it be wrong to treat robots as second rate members of the moral com-
munity? Why would it be important to be fair to a robot? These are vexing questions that
we cannot try to answer here.
What we can do is to note a common line of argumentation in many attempts to show
that robots cannot bear moral responsibility: Take one such property or capacity X on
focus, suggest that it is necessary for moral responsibility, and then argue that robots fail
to instantiate X . Searle’s classic Chinese Room Argument [11] against robot intentional-
ity was not originally targeted against robot responsibility, but has later been appealed to
in that context as well [12,13]. Roboticists and philosophers inspired by Dennett’s idea
of intentional stance grant intentional states like beliefs, desires and intentions to robots,
but not necessarily higher-order intentional states that are required for self-reﬂection.
Dennett himself takes higher-order intentionality as a necessary precondition for moral
responsibility and sees little evidence for such a capability in present-day robots [14].
Raffaele Rodogno similarly argues that current robots are not moral agents. He
builds his argument on a neo-sentimentalist view of morality, according to which grasp
of morality requires both feelings and a capacity to make normative attribution of emo-
tions at issue [13]. Capability of having feelings does not sufﬁce, but an understanding of
when certain attributions are appropriate is required as well. Understanding the meaning
of moral wrong is in part constituted by our having certain justiﬁed moral sentiments.
Robert Sparrow argues that robots lack the capacity to suffer and this makes it difﬁcult
to hold them responsible because holding someone responsible requires at least a con-
ceptual possibility to reward and punish them [15]. Similarly, Christian Neuha¨user ﬁnds
R. Hakli and P. Mäkelä / Robots, Autonomy, and Responsibility150
several capacities, like an evaluative system for considering actions from a moral point
of view, for which it is doubtful whether robots can be said to have them [16].
In general, this is a good argumentative strategy. However, pointing to a capacity X
that current robots lack, easily leads to the roboticists’ reply that they can engineer X in
the next generation of robots. And indeed they have claimed of virtually all the capacities
mentioned above that these can be implemented in robots.
4. Argument against Robot Responsibility
Our argumentative line here is different in the sense that we are willing to grant, for the
sake of the argument, that all of these capacities can be implemented in robots. So let us
assume that we eventually manage to build robots that have higher-order intentionality,
consciousness, and emotions. They are able to critically reﬂect on their values, adopt
those values (or “identify” with those values) that they take to be best supported by
reasons, and be aware of the consequences of their actions. The question we then ask is
this: Suppose we manage to implement all the capacities in robots that are conceptually
required for moral agency, does this guarantee artiﬁcial moral agency? Does this give us
robots that are morally responsible for their actions?
Our reply is: Not necessarily! We claim that having these capacities may not be
enough, because it matters how these capacities were acquired. Here we lean on Alfred
R. Mele’s history-sensitive externalism about autonomy and responsibility [4, pp. 144–
176]. According to it, there is more to being autonomous and responsible for one’s ac-
tions over a stretch of time than what goes on inside an agent during that time. Whether
agents are autonomous depends on the agents’ causal histories, how they came to possess
the intentional attitudes, values, and capacities that they currently have. Mele gives sev-
eral examples of two “psychological twins” whose relevant mental capacities are iden-
tical, but one has authentically acquired those mental capacities and is for that reason
autonomous whereas the other is not, because her capacities were acquired by external
manipulation. Consider the following example [4, p. 145]:
Ann is an autonomous agent and an exceptionally industrious philosopher. She
puts in twelve solid hours a day, seven days a week; and she enjoys almost ev-
ery minute of it. Beth, an equally talented colleague, values a great many things
above philosophy, for reasons that she has reﬁned and endorsed on the basis of
careful critical reﬂection over many years. She identiﬁes with and enjoys her
own way of life—one which, she is conﬁdent, has a breadth, depth, and richness
that long days in the ofﬁce would destroy. Their dean (who will remain name-
less) wants Beth to be like Ann. Normal modes of persuasion having failed, he
decides to circumvent Beth’s agency. Without the knowledge of either philoso-
pher, he hires a team of psychologists to determine what makes Ann tick and
a team of new-wave brainwashers to make Beth like Ann. The psychologists
decide that Ann’s peculiar hierarchy of values accounts for her productivity,
and the brainwashers instill the same hierarchy in Beth while eradicating all
competing values—via new-wave brainwashing, of course. Beth is now, in the
relevant respect, a “psychological twin” of Ann. She is an industrious philoso-
pher who thoroughly enjoys and highly values her philosophical work. Indeed,
it turns out—largely as a result of Beth’s new hierarchy of values—that what-
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ever upshot Ann’s critical reﬂection about her own values and priorities would
have, the same is true of critical reﬂection by Beth. Her critical reﬂection, like
Ann’s, fully supports her new style of life.
According to Mele, although Ann is autonomous, Beth is not, even though they are psy-
chologically similar in all relevant respects. If this is correct, it shows that autonomy
depends on history.
The moral of Mele’s story to robots is obvious: Our suggestion here is that even
though robots could be programmed and engineered to have all the capacities required
of moral agents, they would still not be moral agents, because such programming and
engineering is closer to the kind of autonomy-undermining manipulation that deprives
the authenticity of their capacities than to the authentic acquisition characteristic of the
capacities of real moral agents. It is precisely the fact that the responsibility-relevant
property X was engineered that undermines the responsibility attribution to the agent:
Robots cannot be morally responsible because they are designed and programmed by
other agents to have the “character” they have.
It should be noted that our point is not just that robots are programmed, hence not
free, hence not autonomous. That point has been made several times in the literature,
and it has a standard objection: One could argue that pretty much the same applies to the
“paradigmatic moral agent”, that is, adult human beings. Human beings are what they
are because of their genetic programming (DNA), upbringing, and contingent inﬂuences
from their environment.
True, it can well be the case that human beings’ characters are “determined” by ex-
ternal factors and inﬂuences. However, from the point of view of autonomy relevant for
moral agency, the point is not that being externally determined undermines autonomy,
and mutatis mutandis, moral agency. According to history-sensitive externalism the rel-
evant issue is the kind of determination, and here one could try and argue that robots
by practical necessity have their character in virtue of such a process, that they are nec-
essarily manipulated and thus they are not autonomous because of their history. Moral
responsibility requires autonomous agency in the sense that S is a morally responsible
agent only if S is an autonomous agent (at least in some measure).
Let us look in a bit closer detail at Mele’s conception of authenticity. According
to him, [4, p. 166], a “necessary condition of an agent S’s authentically possessing a
pro-attitude P (e.g. value or preference) that he has over an interval t is that it be false
that S’s having P over that interval is, as I will say, compelled*—where compulsion* is
compulsion not arranged by S.”
Compulsion of a pro-attitude, according to Mele, requires that the shedding, that is,
eradicating or signiﬁcantly attenuating, of the pro-attitude is beyond the agent’s control
in the sense that her psychological constitution precludes her from voluntarily produc-
ing conditions that would empower her to shed the pro-attitude. Such a pro-attitude is
practically unsheddable [4, p. 153].
Even though Mele’s focus is on cases where the agent previously possesses authentic
values which are then bypassed by some kind of manipulation, this is not necessary for
his idea of compulsion [4, p. 168]:
Suppose that it is logically possible for a devil to create an agent with certain
unsheddable pro-attitudes, “identiﬁcations,” and reasons for identiﬁcation al-
ready in place at the time of creation. In such a case, the devil did not “bypass”
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the agent’s capacities for control over his mental life in producing these items,
for the agent had no such capacities when the items were produced. Still, the
agent is reasonably viewed as being possessed of some compelled pro-attitudes
with which he identiﬁes (for reasons); call them compelled innate pro-attitudes.
[. . .] This notion of “innate” pro-attitudes may be extended to apply to agents
who, after coming into existence, but prior to having any (relevant) capacities
for control over their mental lives, are subjected to pro-attitude engineering.
This seems to be the case with robots: Their pro-attitudes are engineered by the de-
signers and implementers, and the robots are not able to shed those pre-programmed
pro-attitudes (as our imaginary soldier above seemed to be). Of course, not all of their
pro-attitudes are pre-programmed. They, too, can learn from the environment, adapt,
and change their behaviour by various machine learning techniques, such as reinforce-
ment learning [17], leading them to behave in ways unpredictable even to their design-
ers. However, it does not seem to matter whether the robot learns or is completely pre-
programmed, because some pro-attitudes will have to be programmed in either case. Oth-
erwise the robot lacks motivation to do anything, including motivation to learn. It will
not do anything! It has to have some kind of objective, like a reward function to maxi-
mize as in reinforcement learning, in order for it to do anything. Taking the intentional
stance, such a function is to be understood as a pro-attitude. Such pro-attitudes guide the
robot’s learning and, as a consequence, its future behaviour, and they seem to be practi-
cally unsheddable. Because such pro-attitudes are programmed by other agents, they are
compelled in Mele’s terminology. Hence, they are not autonomously acquired and lack
authenticity. As a consequence, the responsibility of the robot’s actions that are rooted in
such pro-attitudes is undermined.
Let us still note that it is not essential to the argument that the robots are programmed
by other intentional agents. Mele’s conception of compulsion does not require that the
source of it is an agent [4, p. 169]. Bluntly, the argument is that the “character” of robot
agents is a result of the kind of manipulation which undermines autonomy and respon-
sibility. This is at the core of justiﬁcation of our ﬁrm intuition that robots are not moral
agents.
5. Conclusions
Above we have discussed, the possibility of full-blown citizenship of robots in our moral
community. This would require that we take them to be moral agents, which in turn
requires autonomy and moral responsibility. Rather than solving the problem whether
robots can be morally responsible, our aim has been more diagnostic: We have tried
to ﬁnd support for the common intuition that robots are not autonomous and morally
responsible in the same sense in which human beings are taken to be.
Another approach and a topic to be studied in future work is to consider another
important part of moral agency, namely the awareness of the moral dimension of our
lives. That awareness is signiﬁcant for us because of our ever present weaknesses, we
have to struggle to do the right thing, we have urges to act against our better knowledge,
we have uncertainty about what is right and what is wrong, we are painfully aware of our
responsibility for our decisions, actions, and choices. One might claim that the signiﬁcant
role of morality in our lives is anchored in part in our weakness. It may be that robots do
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not come across as having weaknesses, indeed, it may be that they are too strong, have
too much computational power and are too indefatigable and consistent to be moral in
the full sense. Could it be that their moral agency is problematic, not because they do not
qualify, because they lack some capacities, but because their capacities are ﬂawless to an
amoralizing extent?
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